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Mobile classified data leakage poses a threat to the Department of Defense pro-
grams and missions. Security experts must know the format of application data, in
order to properly classify mobile applications. This research presents the Dynamic
Binary Instrumentation Mobile Android Format Investigation and Analysis (DBI-
MAFIA) methodology to identify stored data formats. DBIMAFIA uses Dynamic
Binary Instrumentation and static analysis to uncover the structure of mobile ap-
plication data and validate the results with traditional reverse engineering methods.
DBIMAFIA is applied to fifteen popular Android applications and revealed the format
of stored data. Notably, user personally identifiable information leakage is identified
in the Hago Games application. The application’s messaging service exposes the full
name, birthday, and city of any user of the Hago Games application. These findings
on how Hago Games uses ObjectBox library to store data in custom file formats can
be applied more broadly to any mobile, IoT, or SCADA device or application us-
ing the ObjectBox library. Furthermore, the DBIMAFIA methodology can be more
broadly defined to identify stored data within any Android application.
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Mobile Application Data Analysis using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation and
Static Analysis
I. Introduction
In May of 2019, President Trump signed Executive Order 13873 [8] stating that
foreign adversaries were creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in communications
equipment to commit economic and industrial espionage against Americans. This
recognized that communications equipment store “vast amounts of sensitive infor-
mation, facilitate the digital economy, and support critical infrastructure and vital
emergency services” [8]. In August 2019, the Android operating system supported
76.23 percent of mobile devices worldwide [9]. The federal government has recog-
nized Android’s popularity and has developed hundreds of Android applications to
allow Americans access to federal agency online resources and programs [10]. Cleared
personnel use a modified Android operating system on tablets that host classified
messages and live stream intelligence data from the Pentagon [11][12]. In response,
cyber security experts must understand how these devices store and process user data
to develop appropriate security procedures.
More private information is stored in mobile and Internet of Things (IoT) devices;
ubiquitousness of the internet has left user data vulnerable, and even private compa-
nies heavily rely on connected devices to access private corporate data. Manufacturers
sacrifice security for convenience. The recent surge of IoT devices has exacerbated
the problem; more sensors and connected devices means a greater volume of data. In
order to understand the increased level of risk, cyber professionals must know what
and how data is stored, processes, and transmitted, to defend the valuable informa-
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tion. Next, this chapter details the motivation, research objectives, and methodology
of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
This research provides a methodology that could potentially aid in the identifica-
tion of classified data leakage and insecure data storage methods of applications used
by US government employees and those applications developed by various federal
agencies.
In 2014, Yahoo fell victim to a series of cyber attacks, exposing names, birth dates,
phone numbers, and physical addresses of over 500 million users [13]. That same year,
over 100 million Marriott customers had there contact, passport, and credit card infor-
mation stolen from Marriott’s servers [13]. From 2014 to 2018 Ebay, Equifax, Target,
Uber, and Chase bank all had similar breaches leaking 100s of millions of valuable
personal and business data to attackers [13]. These attacks, although not exclusively
IoT or mobile targets, spurred governments to strengthen existing data privacy laws
and pressure companies to better protect customer data [14]. Unfortunately many
data privacy laws have resulted in requiring users to agree to accept more responsibil-
ity of the security of the data being collected. In the case of IoT devices, consumers
are the ones responsible for keeping their devices updated and secure [15]. Many IoT
manufacturers stop offering security updates a couple years after product release or
sooner, leaving users unknowingly at risk to cyber attacks.
IoT security concerns are not unique to individual households. The United States
Air Force is one of many organizations supporting the adoption of IoT devices across
their systems. In 2018, the United States Air Force (USAF) launched a smart base
test pilot program with AT&T to enhance Maxwell Air Force Base operations with
IoT devices [16]. As the Air Force begins to include IoT devices in operational
2
networks, it is important to know how the devices affect the overall organizational
security posture.
In 2017, attackers gained access to a casino’s customer data via a vulnerable
fish tank smart thermometer [17]. Through wifi connectivity, the vulnerable smart
thermometer provided attackers a path into the casino’s private network, exposing
private customer information.
Mobile devices share many characteristics of IoT devices, but the way users in-
teract with their smartphones sets them apart. Additionally, smartphones typically
have less variety when it comes to operating systems and configurations. In the field
of mobile security, examiners are mostly concerned with data leakage. The amount
of valuable information that is found on a smartphone is astounding and many users
are unknowingly giving away their data when installing certain mobile applications.
This section discusses several mobile devices and applications that posed a serious
threat to their users.
Huawei, the number one telecom supplier and second largest phone manufacturer
in the world [18], produces a variety of mobile devices, equipment, and services. In
May of 2019 Trump banned the use of Huawei products within the United States
government, on the premise that they form a threat to national security [18].
In December of 2019, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) recom-
mended that DoD employees should not use the Chinese-owned application TikTok
[19]. The United States Army, shortly thereafter, banned troops from downloading
the application on any government phone. Many suspect that the application exports
user data to Chinese constituents.
Facebook, the largely popular social media platform, has also been plagued with
data privacy scandals. The amount of data they collect on their users and how they
share that with other applications has prompted United States (US) Congress to
3
question their CEO’s data privacy practices. Outside organizations have abused the
Facebook Application Program Interface (API) to gain unauthorized access to private
Facebook user data [20]. For example, Cambridge Analytica, collected over 87 million
people’s personally identifiable information, via a seemingly benign quiz application,
Thisisyourdigitiallife [20].
User data leakage threatens the security of the United States and its citizens. From
the Department of Defense (DoD)’s perspective, user data leakage poses a threat to
classified programs and missions. Security experts need to know what data is being
stored on government devices in order to properly classify them. Knowing what data
is stored on devices requires a methodology to determine the format in which appli-
cations store user data. This research proposes the Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
Mobile Android Format Investigation and Analysis (DBIMAFIA) methodology to
determine the format of user data stored by Android applications.
1.2 Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to demonstrate that dynamic binary instrumentation
tools combined with static analysis tools can effectively be used to determine the data
format of popular Android applications.
1.3 Methodology
The initial steps of this research focus on understanding existing mobile data
analysis techniques and tools. The second step develops a methodology that explores
unique implementations of existing mobile analysis tools to allow for a dynamic ap-
proach to reverse engineer the formats of data stored by mobile applications. The
effectiveness of this methodology is demonstrated through the analysis of content and
format data from the following Android applications:
4
1. Hago Games [21]
2. August SmartLock [22]
3. Samsung SmartThings [23]
4. Garmin Connect [24]
5. Whats App [25]
6. Instagram [26]








15. Yale Connect [35]
The methodology for this research can be broken into six main objectives: device
setup, initial analysis, class analysis, synthesis, and validation.
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1.4 Summary
The rest of this document is broken down into four chapters: background research,
methodology, results and conclusion. The background covers Android internals, the
reverse engineering process, a background in forensics and related work to provide
the background necessary to adequately understand this research and the value it
brings to the security of mobile and IoT communities. The DBIMAFIA methodology
covers device setup, the initial analysis of the Android application package (APK) and
application files, native library hooking, class analysis, and synthesis and validation
of results. In the results, we apply the DBIMAFIA methodology to 15 Android
applications and discuss the results of the analysis. The conclusion summarizes the
major conclusions of this research and discusses potential future work.
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II. Background and Literature Review
This chapter provides readers with the necessary context to understand the An-
droid operating system and how examiners can identify, extract and analyze data from
its file system. This information is invaluable to understanding the Dynamic Binary
Instrumentation Mobile Android Format Investigation and Analysis (DBIMAFIA)
methodology and its application in Chapter IV.
The background of this research is broken into four subsections: Android inter-
nals, reverse engineering, forensics, and related work. The Android internals section
gives a brief overview of the operating system and related components. The reverse
engineering section details existing static and dynamic Android reversing tools and
techniques, as well as methods for deciphering unknown file formats. The forensic sec-
tion gives readers the understanding necessary to see how the results of this research
contribute to the mobile forensics community. The related work section discusses
research and tools foundational to the DBIMAFIA methodology.
2.1 Android
This section provides a fundamental understanding of the Android Architecture,
the design of Android applications and how Android applications store and trans-
mit examiner data with an emphasis on databases and Java enterprise beans. This
foundation is necessary to understanding how examiners can reverse engineer appli-




Android is an open source Linux-based operating system, designed for numerous
device types. Figure 1 breaks the platform into six major components: Linux ker-
nel, Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), Android Run-Time (ART), Native C/C++
Libraries, Java API framework, and System applications [1].
Figure 1: The Android software stack [1].
The Linux Kernel provides the foundation of the Android platform. The HAL
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provides standard interfaces for the higher level Java Application Program Interface
(API) framework to communicate with hardware. Android run-time implements the
API that runs each application in its own process with its own instance of Android
Run-Time (ART) [1]. ART runs at least one virtual machine for each application
by executing Dalvik Executable (DEX) files, a byte code format meant to optimize
memory usage [36]. Native C/C++ libraries use numerous Android system compo-
nents. These libraries implement many of the essential functionalities required by the
operating system and third party applications. The Java API framework exposes the
native libraries to higher-level applications. Lastly, the system applications provide
examiners interfaces for examiners to browse the web or message others, while also
allowing these basic functionalities to be built into third-party applications.
2.1.2 Android Application Fundamentals
Before a examiner can begin to reverse engineer an Android Application, he or
she must first understand the Android application components and how they work
together. This section explains the Android Application architecture.
All Android applications are written in Java, Kotlin, or C++. The Android Soft-
ware Development Kit (SDK) compiles application code with any data and resources
into an Android application package (APK) [1]. The APK contains all of the contents
of the application. Each application is isolated into its own security sandbox and is
treated as a different Linux examiner. By default every application is run as its own
process. The Android operating system implements the principle of least privilege to
ensure each application has access to components needed to run the application.
Application Components are the building blocks of the application. There are four
major components: activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers [1]
1. As displayed in Figure 2, these components reside in their own Dalvik virtual
1Note some examiners include a fifth category for permissions as shown in Figure 2
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machine while the application executes.
Figure 2: Android Application Components [2].
Activities serve as entry points for examiner interaction and represent a single
screen or examiner interface that facilitates a number of interactions between the
system and the application [1]. Activities keep track of what information is being
displayed on the screen to ensure related processes continue to run. Activities also
keep track of previously closed processes and their states to allow those processes to
be restarted. Lastly, activities facilitate the closing of processes and the sharing of
information across applications.
Services provide a method to keep an application running in the background of
another application [1]. For example, a music player streams music while an examiner
interacts with another application. The music service is not necessarily displaying any
examiner interface, but is still required to run to provide audio to the examiner. In
general there are two types of services: services the examiner is aware of and services
hidden from the examiner. The system is not likely to kill services the examiner is
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aware of, but there are circumstances where the system kills non-vital background
services to free up Random Access Memory (RAM) for other components. The job
scheduler class is used in Android 5.0 and later to schedule services and actions in an
efficient manner.
Broadcast receivers enable the system to deliver events to the examiner outside
the typical examiner flow [1]. This allows the application to respond to system-wide
broadcast announcements, even when the application is not actively running. A good
example is an application scheduling an alarm to post a notification to the examiner.
When the broadcast from the system is sent, the application’s broadcast receiver sees
the broadcast and initiates the alarm. Android implements a broadcast receiver as
a subclass of the broadcast receiver class, and delivers each broadcast as an intent
object.
Content providers manage shared sets of application data that can be stored in
any persistent storage location that your application can access [1]. For example
any Android application with proper permissions can query the content provider of
the application’s contacts to read and write data. From the system’s perspective a
content provider is an entry point into an application for publishing named data items,
identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme. An application can decide
how it wants to map the data it contains to a URI namespace, handing out those URIs
to other entities which allows access to the data. Content providers allow the system
to access application data without the application running and implement a fine-
grained security model for application data. Content providers also can handle reads
and writes to private, non-shared application data. A content provider is implemented
as a subclass of Content Provider and must implement a standard set of APIs that
enable other applications to perform transactions.
The Android operating system allows an application to start another application’s
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components. For example, a messenger application could request the native camera
component to take a picture to send to another examiner within the messaging ap-
plication. Android applications do not have a single entry point. To activate a com-
ponent in another application, a message specifying the intent to start a component
is sent to the system. Given the application has the rights to use that application’s
component, the system activates the requested component and the image taken is
shared with the messaging application.
The manifest file informs the system what components an application contains.
Your application must declare all of its components in AndroidManifest.xml file at
the root of the application’s project directory [1]. The manifest also declares to the
system the permissions the application requires. In addition, it declares hardware and
software features used and sets the minimum API levels and API libraries required
to run the application.
2.1.3 Android Databases
Understanding how developers store application data is vital to deciphering de-
compiled code and determining the format of unknown file types. Databases are
the obvious choice when deciding to store data that needs be accessed by multiple
examiners. By definition, a database is an electronic system that allows data to be
accessed, manipulated, and updated [37]. This section focuses discussion on relational
databases, and object-oriented databases within the context of Android applications.
Java’s object-oriented nature was not designed with relational databases in mind.
Data stored in objects must be simplified in order to conform the scalar only format
of typical relational database requirements. Developers must query the relational
database, manipulate the data and then store that data into an object. Figure 3 is
a simple C# code example of querying data from an SQL database, reformatting and
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saving the data to the variable, name. These types of queries can usually be identified
by searching the code for mysql related commands in the decompiled code.
var person = "SELECT key, first_name, last_name, sex, age FROM
persons WHERE id = 1";
var result = context.Persons.FromSqlRaw(person).ToList();
var name = result[0]["last_name"];
Figure 3: Without object relational mapper [3].
Object relational mappers attempt to reduce this burden on developers. Object
relational mapper APIs allow the developer to call for the object, and the mapper
makes all the necessary queries to get the object from the relational database. This
comes at a cost of efficiency, as the data still needs to be manipulated every time data
is transferred to and from the database. Figure 4 is an example of the use of an object
relational mapper API, and how the query and data manipulation is abstracted from
the developer.
var person = repository.Get_person(1);
var first_name = person.Get_first_name();
Figure 4: With object relational mapper [3].
Object oriented databases seek to reduce the processing burden of the typical
database formats by storing the data in object form. This eliminates the need to
manipulate and reformat data as it is being read from and written to the database.
XML and NoSQL databases both support saving data in this form [4].
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NoSql databases are unique in the sense that they support unstructured storage.
As illustrated in Figure 5, this means fixed table structures are not required in NoSql.
These flexible key-value pair based structures allow databases to be schema-free or
blue print free.
Figure 5: Relational vs NoSQL [4].
In addition to storing data in object format, NoSql databases can also use column,
document, key value and XML store formats [4]. Despite their schema free nature,
NoSql databases still require application or type specific database parsers to properly
view the data within.
Ultimately developers have plenty of options. Databases are popular, but data




This section provides an overview of enterprise beans and its sub-types. Under-
standing enterprise beans is important to this research because they are commonly
implemented in conjunction with various data serialization libraries. For more de-
tailed documentation on enterprise beans, refer to Java’s Enterprise Edition 6 docu-
mentation [38].
An enterprise bean is a server-side component that encapsulates the business
logic of an application, which is the code that fulfills the purpose of the application.
Enterprise beans simplify the development of large applications by putting beans into
Enterprise Java Bean containers (EJBs), keeping logic within the bean, and delivering
portable components [38]. EJB containers provide system-level services to the bean.
This allows the bean developer to focus on business problems, while the containers
handle system-level services. The client developer no longer has to code the routines
that implement rules or database access, because the bean contains this logic. The
application assembler can now build applications with these portable components.
Enterprise beans support interoperability; they can run across multiple devices,
while keeping their location transparent to clients. Additionally enterprise beans
support transactions, allowing concurrent access to objects, but maintaining data
integrity. Enterprise beans come in two types: session beans and message-driven
beans [38].
2.1.4.1 Session Beans
A session bean encapsulates business logic that a client can invoke locally or
remotely. To access an application on a server, the client invokes the session bean’s
methods. The session performs the work for its client, shielding it from the complexity
by executing tasks inside the server [38]. Note that session beans do not save data to
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a database and are therefore not persistent.
Session beans come in three types: stateful, stateless, and singleton. Table 1 ex-
plains when each type of session bean is necessary. A stateful session bean contains
the state of an object using instance variables that represent the state of a unique
client-bean session. This state is often referred to as the conversational states as the
client talks with its bean. When the client removes the bean, the session ends and
the state disappears. Stateless beans do not maintain a conversational state with
the client. When a client invokes methods of a stateless bean, the bean contains a
client-specific state for the duration of that invocation [38]. Once the method finishes
running, the state disappears. Pooling the stateless beans guarantees thread safety.
Additionally stateless beans only have to be stateless with regards to the client. The
private state of each bean can be held over to the next invocation. Unlike stateful
beans, stateless beans can support multiple clients. Singleton session beans are in-
stantiated once per application and exist for the entire life-cycle of the application.
They are designed for situations where a single bean is shared across clients, who are
concurrently accessing it [38].
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Table 1: Types of Session Beans.
Session Beans
Stateful
The bean’s state represents the interaction between bean and specific client
The bean needs to hold information about client across method invocations.
The bean mediates between the client and other application components.
The bean manages the work flow of several beans.
Stateless
The bean’s state has no data for a specific client.
A method invocation requires the bean to perform a task for all clients.
The bean implements a web service.
Singleton
State needs to be shared across the application.
An enterprise bean needs to be accessed by multiple threads concurrently.
The app needs a bean to perform tasks upon app startup and shutdown.
State needs to be shared across the application.
2.1.4.2 Message-Driven Beans
A message-driven bean allows asynchronous message processing between end points,
which session beans cannot support. Message-driven beans act as a Java Message
Service (JMS) listener. Messages can be sent by any Java EE component or JMS
application or system. Message-driven beans can process JMS and a variety of other
message types. Message-Driven beans have the following characteristics [38]:
1. They execute upon receipt of a single client message.
2. They are invoked asynchronously.
3. They are relatively short-lived.
4. They do not represent directly shared data in the database, but they can access
and update this data.
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5. They can be transaction-aware.
6. They are stateless.
Message-driven beans share a number of features with stateless session beans.
Neither of the bean instances retain data for specific clients. Both beans ensure that
all instances are equivalent, allowing proper pooling of beans. Lastly, both beans can
process data from multiple clients.
Message-driven beans handle state differently from instance to instance. The in-
stance variables of the message driven beans contain some state across client message
handling. They do this through the use of the Java Metadata Interface (JMI) API,
open database connections, or object references to enterprise beans [38]. Clients do
not invoke methods directly on the beans, but rather clients access the beans through
JMS or other similar protocols. They send messages to the destination and the
message-driven bean class acts as the message listener. When the message arrives,
the container calls the onMessage method to process the message. This method typ-
ically casts the message out to one of the five JMS message types and handles it
according to the logic of the application. onMessage often invokes helper methods
or other session beans to process the message and store it in a database. In short,
Message-Driven beans offer asynchronous message processing that avoids tying up
server resources.
2.2 Reverse Engineering Android Applications
Reverse engineering is a process of determining how a system works without access
to the source code or original specifications [39]. This process supports legitimate
interoperability to closed systems and illegitimate adversaries intent on gaining access
to unauthorized data.
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In this research, we divide reverse engineering into two categories: static and
dynamic software analysis. During static software analysis, the examiner takes the
executable code from the device, including the stored memory, and recreates the
software structure. Static analysis helps to create a flow diagram of software, to
assist examiners, and to derive the behavior and function of the code. Dynamic
analysis provides the software’s behavior, giving examiners insight into the volatile
memory being used during execution that may not be visible during static analysis.
From static and dynamic analysis, the examiner can determine the device’s behavior,
functions, protocols, and communication sensors of the device.
2.2.1 Static Reverse Engineering Android Applications
Application developers seldom release the source code of their applications [40].
Android application reverse engineering is necessary to understand how the appli-
cation communicates and stores information. While reversing Android applications
follows the traditional reverse engineering process, specific tools and techniques are
necessary to handle the intricacies of Android applications.
Static analysis of an application gives the examiner a better understanding of
the layout of the file system, without having to run the file [41]. Dr. Richard Dill
breaks down Android application reverse engineering into five distinct steps: Access,
Unpacking, Dissimilation, Building, and Signing [40]. These steps recognize the com-
mon process used to reverse engineer Android applications, however the building and
signing steps are only necessary for cases when the application is modified to support
other analysis techniques.
Access
In order to retrieve an APK for an Android application, the examiners must either
download the APK file using websites like Apkpure.com [42] or Apkmirror.com [43] or
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retrieve them directly from the phone. Examiners statically analyze the downloaded
APK to determine the application’s layout. However, used applications retrieved
from a device provide the examiner with more data to analyze.
The Android operating system does not initially allow examiners to access their
application’s internal files. Linux partitions files and limits access to the internal file
system. In order to retrieve these files, the examiner must first elevate privileges to
root access; this can be gained by unlocking your bootloader and running an SU binary
in the system partition [44]. When an application tries to run, the operating system
then checks this SU binary to ensure that the application attempting to run as root
has been verified to have root privileges [44]. A SuperUser management application is
then used to grant privileges to applications on your system. Many rooting methods
exist; some to specific hardware manufacturers, while others generically run on any
device running the Android operating system. After gaining root privilieges, the
examiner can use Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to access the entire file system.
Unpacking
Once the APK is acquired, the APK is unpacked to expose the application’s files
and DEX code. The Android operating system uses the ZLIB format to compress
its applications before distributing applications via the Google Play Store [45]. Files
compressed with the ZLIB compression package can be unpacked using popular tools
such as 7Zip [46] or JADX [47]. Unpacking reveals the application’s file system. From
this, examiners have access to readable files with known file formats, however .DEX
file(s) requires dissimilation to be further examined.
Dissimilation
Dissimilation requires the examiner to either disassemble or decompile the un-
packed .DEX files to properly convert the .DEX files into meaningful information [40].
Disassembly of the unpacked .DEX files results in Smali code [48], an intermediary
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language between the source and the byte code. Smali and Baksmali are respectively
assemblers and disassemblers for the .DEX file format [49]. Smali code describes at
a low level how and where the Android application stores information in registers,
variables, methods, and various memory locations. Decompiling the byte code of
the .DEX file results in a Java code representation, which is not the original source
code, but logically equivalent. The logically equivalent Java code is another way for
examiners to understand the application’s code. JADX, JEB [50], and IDA Pro [51]
are all popular decompilers for the dex file format.
Building
The building phase consists of reassembling the files of the application back into
an APK. Android Studio and ApkTool are both free tools that can be used to build
APKs.
Signing
The last step is to sign the APK before dissemination. This is done using a public
key certificate and allows Google to ensure that all future updates come from the
same developer. This can be accomplished using the build feature in Android Studio
[52].
2.2.2 Dynamic Reverse Engineering Android Applications
This section demonstrates three effective dynamic reverse engineering techniques
for the Android operating system: sandboxing, debugging, and dynamic binary in-
strumentation. Unlike static reverse engineering that provides a picture of the appli-
cation without execution, dynamic reverse engineering allows the examiner to observe
the application’s behavior as it executes [41].
Sandboxing
Sandboxing allows examiners to understand how applications work without hav-
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ing access to the original application’s source code. Sandboxes execute applications
within various types of containers that log relevant actions and changes to memory.
Sandboxes are useful to detect malware and log internet requests. Cuckoo-droid [53]
and Joe Sandbox [54] are both Android sandboxes that offer detailed information on
applications.
Debugging
Debugging allows an examiner to set breakpoints in the code of an application
to view variable types and data as they are stored on the memory heap and stack.
Debugging allows examiners to dynamically watch data while it is being transformed.
Developers release Android applications without debugging enabled, requiring ex-
aminers to decompile, enable debug mode, recompile, resign, and reinstall the appli-
cation before Java code debugging can occur with the native Android Studio applica-
tion. This method allows examiners the ability to step through the decompiled Java
code of the application. Android studio provides Android debugging functionality for
free [52], but requires some version of Java source code. The Smalidea plugin [48]
for Android Studio allows the examiner to step through the unpacked .DEX files of
an application, without ever having to decompile or repackage an application [48].
Android debuggers like IDA Pro [51] and JEB [50] offer paid debugging options.
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
Dynamic binary instrumentation provides the ability to modify application be-
havior at run-time. These methods inject an agent into the application, that allows
methods and data to be changed during application execution. This can be used
to display or modify variables upon entering or exiting a function as pushed on the
stack.
One such tool, Frida [5], injects a Javascript engine into the application, allowing
examiners to write Javascript code to interact and change code of the application
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as it executes. This allows the examiner to manipulate and analyze applications as
needed.
Figure 6 illustrates how Frida interacts with the target application to run custom
Javascript code to modify functionality at runtime. Frida begins by saving the frida-
agent shared library to the application. The Linux Ptrace command is used to
hijack thread2. The hijacked thread writes the bootstrapper to memory, a program
that creates a thread without user interaction. The bootstrapper creates the Frida
thread within the program. The Frida thread loads the frida-agent into memory, and
a connection is established with the debugger process to inject any code from the
examiner. The hijacked thread resumes, and the debugged process runs as normal.
Figure 6: How Frida Interacts with Application [5].
Rather than modifying the code at rest or while debugging the code, Frida’s
technique of code injection modifies the code at run-time. This subverts common
anti-reverse engineering techniques that look for signs of code modification or changes
common to debuggers’ breakpoints.
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2.2.3 Anti-Reverse Engineering Techniques
Developers work to protect the application examiner data, employing a variety of
techniques to thwart reverse engineering. This section focuses on methods to protect
data at rest and methods to protect data during execution.
Proguard, an application obfuscator, is a free program that shrinks Android APKs,
optimizes code, and obfuscates classes, methods, and variables. Proguard’s obfusca-
tion techniques rename and remove unused variables, classes and methods. This
makes code analysis challenging, because variable, method and class names help de-
termine the application’s functionality. Additionally, Proguard’s effect on proper
decompilation can prevent functions from being properly decompiled to Java code. If
the improperly decompiled code should ever be modified and re-compiled, the appli-
cation is likely to fail at compilation [55].
Java-level debugging is a reverse engineering technique to help understand code
flow, however all applications are by default not debuggable. An examiner can alter
the flag in the application’s manifest.xml file, but this requires the application to be
decompiled, modified, resigned, and redeployed. Even with this illicit modification,
application developers employ methods to detect and prevent their applications from
being debugged: code hashing, time checks, Tracer Process Identity (TRACERPID)
comparisons, and certification validation.
Any time a break point is set, the code is modified [56]. This change results
in a modified hash of that given block of code. Concerned developers check hashes
of portions of code during execution to detect and crash a debugged version of the
application.
Timing checks identify delays in code execution to determine whether an applica-
tion is being debugged [56]. This method is only as secure as the timing mechanism
used to detect delays. A reverse engineer could spoof the timer to convince the
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application that it is in fact running as normal.
The TRACERPID represents the process id (PID) of the application that is trac-
ing the existing process. This value is normally zero, however when debugging, this
value is set to the PID value of the debugger. Developers can check this value at
random times during execution to detect and crash the application when it is being
debugged [56].
Developers can view the certificate being used to run the application to determine
if it is equivalent to the original [56]. Repackaged applications fail this check, as they
are not signed with the original certificate.
Dexguard [57] and Dexprotector [58] are both commercialized programs that im-
plement several anti-debugging techniques to keep applications safe from a variety
of debugging techniques. A reverse engineer could search the decompiled code for
comparison operators and remove them from the application, but is time consuming
and tedious.
2.2.4 Deciphering file formats
This section details traditional static and dynamic reversing techniques to decipher
file formats, as first described in Secrets of Reverse Engineering [59], Eilam.
First, the examiner should determine the purpose and intent of the application.
Second, the examiner identifies known, easy to spot values in the analyzed files. This
may or may not be possible depending on encryption, compression, or obfuscation lev-
els. Third, Eliam recommends providing different inputs to monitor how the targeted
file changes. The fourth step is to verify that features such as passwords are indeed
checked when interacting with the application. The fifth step involves opening the
file in a hex editor and checking the first couple bytes for a file signature and making
observations on the rest of the file. Eliam mentions character distribution analysis as
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a method of determining whether or not the file is encrypted. The sixth step focuses
on creating a list of all imported functions using programs such as Windows Dumpbin
[60]. This list provides an overview of how the program works and reads and writes to
files. He recommends placing break points on function calls identified to the imported
functions to help dynamically step through the program in a debugger. He provides
a specific Windows example, examining entries in the Kernel32.dll and uses that
to trace calls to the file input and output APIs.
2.3 Forensics
Although this research is founded on reverse engineering principles and processes,
it is also necessary to understand the forensic process in order to see how the results
of this research can be applied to extracting forensically relevant data. The major
distinction between the two fields is that forensic results typically support the enforce-
ment of the law and attempt to minimize changes made to a system, whereas reverse
engineering attempts to understand how a system works. This section is broken into
four forensic specialties: traditional, digital, mobile, and Internet of Things (IoT).
2.3.1 Traditional Forensics
Forensics is the discipline of applying scientific knowledge to legal problems [61].
Forensic science is therefore any science used for the purpose of law [61]. All forensic
sciences are founded in Locard’s principle, which states that “any two objects that
come in contact with each other will exchange material.” This leads to the conclusion
that a person or object always leaves a trace when visiting a place or crime scene.
It is upon this theory that the Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC)
developed a framework for harmonizing forensic science practices. OSAC’s framework
divides the forensics process into four distinct parts [62]:
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1. Authentication: Verify the claim.
2. Identification: Associate the entity with the action taken.
3. Classification: Compare different pieces of evidence to identify specific origin(s).
4. Reconstruction: Put the evidence together to answer the who, what and where.
Each step should be a repeatable and consistent process that makes up the greater
forensics framework. All four parts act as individual forms of evaluation that help
inform and refine the other parts of the forensics process. OSAC determined that the
value of forensic science was its use of scientific reasoning to provide decision-makers
with an understanding of evidence presented to help them make educated decisions.
2.3.2 Digital Forensics
Digital forensics includes everything from physical electronic devices to network
traffic and various digital media forms. Locard’s principle states that any interaction
with an electronic device leaves a trace. On a relatively small system, examiner
interaction, programs running in the background and logging of file system changes
add up to hundreds of gigabytes of digital forensics data. Locating evidence that is
relevant to a case among the billions of other bytes of information can be challenging.
OSAC’s framework applies to all forensic processes, including those outside the
realm of electronics. It is upon this framework that many digital forensic processes
are developed. While digital forensic processes vary greatly by situation, the four
principles that ring true across most processes are [63]:
• No action should be taken that changes data that may later be used as evidence.
• Any examiner accessing original data should be competent and able to explain
necessity and implications of actions taken.
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• Steps taken should be repeatable and properly documented such that another
examiner could reach the same results.
• Reconstructions: Put the evidence together to answer the who, what and where.
With these principles in mind many digital forensic investigations begin by making
a bitwise copy of the contents of a computer’s hard drive. Following this a capture of
the system’s memory is made. Most examiners then perform analysis on the copied
drives, and memory capture, ensuring analysis tools do not affect the original drive
or system. Please note that most memory capture tools and some hard drive copying
methods leave at least some trace on the machine; it is therefore imperative that
examiners are knowledgeable of exactly what traces are left from their activity on the
original drive.
2.3.3 Mobile Forensics
Mobile forensics is a subset of digital forensics that frequently refers to the exam-
ination of smart phones [64].
Mobile forensics would ideally follow the same process of imaging the contents
of a smart phone’s hard drive and performing a capture of the phone’s memory.
Unfortunately, forensics on mobile phones is difficult because of safeguards phone
manufacturers, carriers and developers have put in place. Open source and com-
mercial mobile forensic programs rely heavily on kernel or root access to a device to
function properly. The ideal of not changing a single bit on a mobile device during
the forensics process is therefore not practical [65]. This has lead many to be skep-
tical of the forensic soundness of mobile forensic techniques. However, with proper
technical expertise, it is possible to extract valuable evidence from mobile devices
[66]. To do so, the examiner must ensure that they can properly explain the necessity
and implications of any actions taken. Mobile security risks can be broken into three
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risk categories: physical, service, and application [67]. These risks are assessed to
ensure that evidence on mobile devices has not been altered before, during, or after
the collection of devices.
2.3.4 IoT Forensics
An IoT device is defined as any embedded device with the capability of remote
connectivity. The examination of IoT devices crosses several forensic disciplines.
There is onboard memory on most IoT devices that typically stores firmware and
small amounts of log data. There are also numerous mobile companion applications
that help set up, control and store varying amounts of IoT data.
Accessing IoT data from these locations requires the examiner to interact with the
device’s onboard memory via physical acquisition of a JTAG port. Other methods
require examiners to desolder the memory chip and to solder it onto an identical
device. These methods alter the state of hardware and carry severe risk of destroying
potential evidence.
IoT mobile applications have the potential to store valuable IoT data but require
examiners to gain kernel or root privileges to access most data. Rooting common
mobile devices requires a device password, and an available exploit to utilize a vul-
nerability in a specific version of hardware and software. Despite these difficulties
experts focus many investigations on mobile devices, because they frequently contain
large amounts of pertinent examiner data from a variety of sources.
2.4 Related Work
Related work is broken into six categories of tools and research: Disassemblers and
Decompilers, Static Instrumentation Tools, Dynamic binary instrumentation Tools,
Application Analysis, Data Collection Tools, and Android File Format Analysis. All
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six categories of tools and research are closely related to developing a methodology
to determine the format of Android application examiner data.
In support of the United States Air Force Research Labratory (AFRL), TwoSix
Labs released a research paper in December 2019, documenting and comparing pop-
ular disassembly and decompilation, static instrumentation, and dynamic analysis
tools [6].
2.4.1 Disassemblers and Decompilers
TwoSix Labs analyzed and compared IDA Pro [51], Ghidra [68], and Binary Ninja
[69]. These disassemblers and decompilers were presumably chosen for their popular-
ity amongst the reverse engineering community. All three programs support disas-
sembly of various architectures, but Binary Ninja currently lacks decompilation ca-
pabilities. Both Ghidra and IDA Pro decompile most binaries to a C like pseudocode
that can aid examiners in reverse engineering binaries from a variety of architectures.
Binary Ninja’s lack of decompilers is supplemented with a variety of intermediate lan-
guages that focus more on readability of code, rather than reproducing source code.
TwoSix labs found all three tools to offer advantages in particular use cases. Figure 7
summarizes the features of all three tools.
2.4.2 Static Instrumentation Tools
TwoSix Labs analyzed three static instrumentation tools that facilitate debugging,
tracing and profiling [6]. Multiverse [70] is a static rewriter that can add or remove
security features of a binary without debug symbols or relocation entries. Multiverse
does so by disassembling the binary into a superset disassembly that contains all
legal instructions and then uses an instruction rewriter to relocate instructions and































instrumentation, some of its more advanced capabilities require instrumentation to
be present. DDisasm [71] aims to provide examiners with a tool that can disassemble
executables into a form that can be correctly assembled back into an execuatble in
a fully automated manner. In tests DDisam correctly reassembled 98.44 percent of
binaries. Note that both Multiverse and DDISAM were designed specifically for the
x86 architecture, and not Android architectures. Library to Instrument Executable
Formats (LIEF) was the last static instrumentation tool mentioned and it was men-
tioned because of its amount of documentation and ease of use. It offers Python,
C++, and C APIs to parse, edit and analyze executables. LIEF works with Linux,
macOS, Windows, and Android x86 binaries. Figure 8 summarizes the features of all
three tools.
Figure 8: Static Instrumentation Tools Comparison [6].
2.4.3 Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tools
TwoSix Labs compared performance and use cases between two dynamic binary
instrumentation tools: rr [72] and Frida [51]. The rr open source x86 debugger enables
examiners to deterministically replay execution and reverse execute from a breakpoint
[73]. The goal is to provide examiners with the ability to retrigger crashes. Frida,
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as discussed in the background of this research, is a dynamic binary instrumentation
toolkit designed for x86 and ARM architectures. TwoSix Labs found Frida’s ability
to inject code and trace execution to enable new methods of reverse engineering.
Figure 9 summarizes the features of both dynamic binary instrumentation tools.
Figure 9: Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tools Comparison [6].
2.4.4 Application Analysis
Sicurezza Reti explored how Java method hooking could dynamically check appli-
cations for malicious code or vulnerabilities [36]. His research successfully identified
private examiner information accesses, internet connections, and deprecated or inse-
cure protocol usage. His research utilized Android Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
(ADBI) and Legend [74] to hook methods and analyze 32-bit applications running on
Android versions 4.2-6.01 [75].
2.4.5 Data Collection Tools
In June of 2018, Ricordo Spolaor published research on DELTA, a data extrac-
tion and logging tool for Android [76]. He categorized smartphone data into three
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categories: sensor data, device context data, and examiner interaction. Spolaor men-
tioned Android data collection tools: Systemsens [77], DroidWatch [78], Mobilsens
[79], PhoneLab [80], LiveLab [81], and DeviceAnalyzer [82]. He stated that these
tools fail to provide a modular design, consistency in data collection, and consistency
in sampling rates. Spolaor argued that DELTA meets these requirements and claimed
that DELTA collected data from more sources than any of the aforementioned tools.
DELTA and the five other tools mentioned in Spolaor’s report lack any support for
extraction of data from application specific databases. Andriller [7], an open source
forensic decoder, offers its examiners decoders for Android applications. Figure 10
shows the decoders available through Andriller. The tool focuses on the extraction
of text and voice messages from the Android operating system and popular Android
messaging applications. This research found Andriller to be the best open source
Android forensic tool that extracted examiner data from applications. Although it
focused specifically on voice and messaging applications, its interface, feature set, and
modularity set it apart from other Android forensic tools.
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Figure 10: Andriller’s Decoders [7].
2.4.6 Android File Format Analysis
Dr. Richard Dill’s research explored the automation of mobile device file format
analysis. Dr. Dill parsed and prepped applications to display proper method offsets.
He created and ran the Automated Data Structure Slayer (ADSS) to automate the
injection of hooks to uncover structures used to store and process application data.
2.4.7 Related Work Summary
This section discussed six categories of tools and research that are foundational
to this research. The DBIMAFIA methodology builds off of Dr. Dill’s and the afore-
mentioned tools and research to provide examiners with a way to approach mobile
data format analysis that does not require the parsing and prepping of an application.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter covered Android internals and the reverse engineering process, pro-
vided a background in forensics and related work necessary to understand this research
and the value it brings to the security of mobile and IoT communities.
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III. Methodology
In this research we debut the Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Mobile Android
Format Investigation and Analysis (DBIMAFIA) methodology for analyzing formats
of mobile application data. The DBIMAFIA methodology covers device setup, initial
analysis of the application and its files, native method hooking, class analysis, and
the synthesis and validation of results. Step one of DBIMAFIA focuses on gaining
root access. Step two primarily focuses on application file analysis and unpacking
and decompilation of the app’s Android application package (APK). Step three of
DBIMAFIA explores how dynamic binary instrumentation tools can be used to hook
native method calls. Step four uses static and analysis and dynamic binary instru-
mentation to analyze Java classes. Step five synthesizes the findings from the class
analysis phase to come to conculsions about how the application is storing and ma-
nipulating user data. The sixth and final step uses a byte debugger to determine the
validity of conclusions made in step five.
Figure 11: DBIMAFIA Methodology Overview.
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3.1 Device Setup
The DBIMAFIA methodology requires elevated access to the mobile phone’s in-
ternal file system to determine how data is processed by the application. In step one
of the DBIMAFIA methodology, the examiner gains root access to the mobile device
to ensure he/she has access to necessary files.
The examiner downloads and installs the Android SDK platform-Tools package
to a computer [1]. This package contains Android Debug Bridge (ADB), a command
line tool that interacts with the Android device. The examiner executes the following
steps to achieve root access [83]:
1. Enable Developer Options and Unlock Bootloader.
2. Install Magisk Manager.
3. Push factory boot image to device.
4. Patch the boot image
5. Restart and flash phone with modified boot image.
Once the phone is rooted, the examiner installs Frida server to support dynamic
analysis [5].
3.2 Initial Analysis
The second step in the DBIMAFIA process is responsible for the analysis of files
changed due to examiner interaction and the unpacking and decompilation of the
application’s APK. Initial Analysis is broken into six subsetps:




4. Unpack and decompile/disassemble APK
5. ID libraries and application architecture
6. Modify Frida for 32-bit support
3.2.1 Initial Analysis Step One: Logical Copy of Application files and
APK
The examiner pulls a copy of the APK and stored application data in the \data
\data\com.appname.example\ directory, before dynamically interacting with the ap-
plication. This gives the examiner a way to come back to a fresh state between each
test and supports the need for file comparison in the initial analysis phase.
The next step is recording the time that interaction with the application began.
This research found that creating an empty file immediately before application inter-
action creates a reference point to identify future file changes.
3.2.2 Initial Analysis Step Two: Application Interaction
At this point the examiner opens and interacts with the app, testing each feature
to identify how data is stored. For applications requiring external hardware, this step
requires the examiner to interact with the external hardware. Next, the examiner
notes the file changes since the creation of the blank file. The “-newer” option of the
Linux find command provides examiners with a way of recording recently modified
files.
Examiners run Modification Detective, a script found in Section 1.1 of the Ap-
pendix, to automate the majority of this process. User-input for both the application
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and external devices is still required. Modification Detective creates a blank file in
the \sdcard folder and waits a specified number of seconds for user interaction. Files
that change while the script is running are pulled back to the examiner’s computer.
3.2.3 Initial Analysis Step Three: File Analysis
In this step, the examiner analyzes the structure of the APK via static analysis.
The examiner begins with using the Linux diff command to compare the modified
files with the files saved prior to interaction. The Linux file command is then used to
determine the file type of the modified file(s). Linux’s binwalk -E is used to output
an entropy graph that examiners can use to determine whether the file is obfuscated or
encrypted. Examiners look for linear entropy graphs to identify encrypted files. The
Linux strings command is run on the file of interest to identify American Standard
Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) strings. If examiners come across plain-
text or known file types, they should skip to step 5 of the DBIMAFIA methodology
and summarize their findings.
3.2.4 Initial Analysis Step Four: Unpack and Decompile APK
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, applications are distributed in a compressed package
known as an APK. To analyze an application, the examiner must unpack the APK
into .DEX and application files. The .DEX files are then disassembled and decompiled
into Smali and Java pseudocode. JADX automates this process; it takes an inputted
APK, unpacks, disassembles and decompiles the application for the examiner [47].
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3.2.5 Initial Analysis Step Five: Identify Imported Libraries and Ap-
plication Architecture
Examiners open the \lib directory inside the unpacked APK and analyze the
libraries within. The folder name within the \lib directory distinguishes the applica-
tion’s architecture. The examiner now searches the names of the shared library files
to determine the associated library names.
3.2.6 Initial Analysis Step Six: Modify Frida for 32-bit Applications
In order to get access to contents of the stack on 32-bit applications, Frida’s thread
and context pointers must be manually modified. These modifications ensure that the
DebugStackVisitor class in the hook script properly hooks the targeted application
methods. The DebugStackVisitor class extends the ArtStackVisitor class in the
Android.js file of the Frida-Java environment. The ArtStackVisitor class utilizes
Native Android APIs to display information on the memory stack.
The android.js file within the \lib folder of the Frida-Java-Bridge environment
[5] is modified. Changes are made to the ArtStackVisitor class to adapt it for the
32-bit version of the libart.so. This modification adds offsets to the thread and
context pointers to ensure they address the proper portions of memory. Examiners
calculate the offsets using a modified version of Oleavr’s art-internals probe.py script
[84]. The original script found offsets for the virtual machine and instrumentation.
Modifications to the script are made to calculate the thread and context offsets of the
desired architecture and Android version. Android’s open source nature allows users
access to the operating system’s C object files. The script accepts a C++ source code
file and modifies all private methods to public. Then, the script uses C’s offsetof()
macro [85] to calculate the offsets of the thread and context fields.
The following changes are made to the android.js code of the Frida-Java-Bridge
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environment:
As demonstrated in Figure 12, the line calculating the thread and context pointers
is replaced by two lines that add offsets to the thread and context pointers.
//api[’art::StackVisitor::StackVisitor’](visitor, thread, context,
// WalkKind[walkKind], ptr(numFrames), checkSuspended ? 1 : 0);
visitor.add(4).writePointer(thread); //thread, of type pointer
visitor.add(40).writePointer(context); //context, of type pointer
Figure 12: Offsets added to thread and context pointers.




Figure 13: Remove 64 bit frame info import.
These changes allow examiners to use the ArtStackVisitor class to view the
contents of the memory stack of 32–bit Android applications.
3.3 Native Method Hooking
The third step of the DBIMAFIA methodology is responsible for the hooking
of the native libc.so open() and write() methods to provide the examiner with
knowledge about where to begin class analysis. This section is broken into three
substeps:
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1. Hook open and obtain file descriptor
2. Hook write and dump stack, and written methods
3. Analyze written data
3.3.1 Native Method Hooking Step One: Hook Open Methods and
Obtain File Descriptor
The examiner must hook the open() and obtain the file descriptor prior to hooking
the write(). There are multiple native libraries that read, write, and transform files,
but the libc.so native library is the most common. The libc.so open() method
takes in three arguments: file path, flags specifying read or write permissions, and
a mode that details which user groups have what access [86]. Figure 14 illustrates
an open() call hook that takes in the file path and compares it to the file path of
interest. When they match, the file descriptor is saved for later comparison in the
libc.so write() hook.
Figure 14: Obtaining File Descriptor.
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The examiners use code in Figure 15 to hook the libc.so open() method and
capture the file descriptor. As we recall from Figure 14, libc.so open() accepts the
file path, the flags and the mode as arguments.
open_hook =
Interceptor.attach(Module.findExportByName(’libc.so’,’open’),{
onEnter: function (args) {
var value = Memory.readUtf8String(args[0]);
if (typeof value !== ’undefined’) {
/* If the target file name is found in the arguments, save the
file name.*/
if (value.indexOf(target_filename) !== -1)
this._open_fileName = value;}
},
onLeave: function (retval) {
// If valid file descriptor, add to file _descriptor_array
if (retval.toInt32() > 0) {
file_descriptor_array[retval.toInt32()] = this._open_fileName;}
}});
Figure 15: Javascript hook of libc.so open().
3.3.2 Native Method Hooking Step Two: Hook Write, Dump Stack
and Written Data
As shown in Figure 16, the examiner hooks the libc.so write() method to dump
the memory stack prior to writing data to the target file. If the libc.so open() or
write() methods are not hooking as expected, open up the Linux man page [86]
and explore other methods involved with saving data. Libc.so’s iotcl(), fnctl(),
write64, pwrite64, pwrite, writev, and put() are other native candidate methods
to hook.
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Figure 16: Dumping Stack.
As shown in Figure 16, the libc.so write() hook grabs the file name associated
with the inputed file descriptor. Upon the libc.so’s return, the file name compares




onEnter: function (args) {
try{




catch{throw new Error("Invalid file_descriptor array reference");}
;
},
onLeave: function (retval) {
if (retval.toInt32() > 0) { //Ensures valid return value
//If file name equal to target file name, dump the stack
if (typeof this._write_fileName !== ’undefined’) {
if (this._write_fileName.includes(target_filename) !== -1){






Figure 17: Javascript hook of libc.so write().
As shown in Figure 18, the dumpstack() method is called from the write hook.
dumpstack() grabs the correct virtual machine and creates a new environment in
order to access and print the methods on the stack. It then passes in a thread from




const vm = Java.vm;
const env = vm.getEnv();
Java.perform(function (){
withRunnableArtThread(vm, env, thread => {










Figure 18: Dump methods on the stack.
The DebugStackVisitor() method, found in Figure 19, takes in a thread and
outputs method names and frame info on every method on the stack. As we discussed
in section 3.2.6, the ArtStackVisitor class utilizes Native Android APIs to display
information on the memory stack.
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const location = this.describeLocation();
console.log(‘\t${location}‘)
const method = this.getMethod();
if (method !== null){
console.log(‘\t\tArtMethod=${method.handle}‘);
const frameInfo = this.getCurrentQuickFrameInfo();







Figure 19: Debugging Stack Visitor.
We clear the data and cache prior to hooking the libc.so open() to force the
application to re-open the data.mdb file. Next, we execute monkey -p com.yy.hiyo
-c android.intent.category.LAUNCHER 1 to launch the default activity via the
ADB interface. The Frida command in Figure 20 uses the frida-Java-playground
environment to run user defined Javascript hooks on an application. The “-no pause”
Frida argument is added to the Frida hook command to ensure that it hooks the libc
open immediately after the application began running.
frida -U com.yy.hiyo -l _agent.js --enable-jit --no-pause
Figure 20: Frida command to inject hooks.
After executing the command in Figure 20, the application starts and the Javascript
code in figures 15, 17, 18, and 19 is injected.
A simplified example output of a hooked write call can be found in Figure 21.
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The value 2020 was written to the file and displayed in figure 21. In the case of
non-readable type variables, Java prints the type of the variable. This requires more
analysis to determine exactly what data is being written. In figure 21 there are three
methods on the stack when the write call is made. Note that this displays only those
methods on the stack and not necessarily every method called prior to the libc.so
write(). The methods go from most recently called on the top to oldest on the
bottom. In this example the io.value class’s store() method is the last method
called. The bool preceding the class name represents the return type of that method
as a boolean operator. In some cases the walkstack output gives enough information
to get a top-level view of how data is retrieved or manipulated prior to being written
to a file. This may be enough for an examiners needs. In other cases, the data’s
format is still unclear and continued dynamic and static analysis is required.
In Figure 21, calls are made to userinput(), add(), and multiply() methods,
and would likely infer that some values were inputted by the examiner and then im-
mediately multiplied together. While the walkstack output can be useful, examiners





[Top of Stack (Most Recently Called)]
Visiting method ’bool io.value.store(int[])’
Visiting method ’int[] io.value.add(int)’
Visiting method ’int com.example.multiply(int[])’
Visiting method ’int[] com.example.userinput()’
[Bottom of Stack]
<<< walkStack
Figure 21: Method Calls from Memory Stack
3.3.3 Native Method Hooking Step Three: Analyze Written Data
This subsection focuses on analyzing the data written to the file of interest. If the
examiners are immediately able to identify the data’s format, they would skip to step
5 of the DBIMAFIA methodology. Otherwise, the examiners should use the methods
outlined in this subsection to attempt to determine the format of the bytes.
In many cases data is encapsulated within a Java object. If this is the case,
examiners should use Java’s Object.println() to obtain the ASCII representation
of the class. Additionally, examiners run the Object.getName() method on the
object to obtain the object’s class name. If this is unsuccessful, examiners use online
converters [87] [88] to convert the binary, decimal, or hex representation of the data
to unicode, utf-8, utf-16, utf-32, and ASCII formats to identify readable characters.
The examiners now know which methods were called prior to file libc.so write,
and have a better understanding of the data written to the file. If the examiners are
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able to identify the storage format at this step, they should skip the class analysis
section and begin synthesizing and validating their results.
3.4 Class Analysis
Step 4 of the DBIMAFIA methodology uses static analysis and dynamic binary
instrumentation to analyze Java classes. The goal of this step is to provide the
examiner with information to identify the purpose of every class that modifies user-
data.
Examiners begin analysis on the method called prior to the file write. This method
is at the top of the output of method calls output in Figure 21. After static analysis
of io.value.store(), examiners use the code in Figure 22 to print the method’s
arguments, return value, and the method that called the hooked method.
The code in lines 8 through 35 of Figure 22 is run in place of the original method.
To ensure the application runs properly, the original method is called on line 14 of
Figure 22 and the result is saved and returned on line 30. Line 38 and 39 of Figure 22
defines the class and method to be hooked. Line 40 defines the types of arguments
passed into the method.
This ability to re-implement any method allows the examiner access to any data
that the original method would also have access to. In the case of the code in Fig-
ure 22, the examiner uses this to print the values found on the stack. However, Frida
is not limited to reading values on the stack, Frida can read and modify data at the
same permission level of the existing method call.
The examiner uses the calling method output to trace the method calls until they
find the code responsible for manipulating or creating the user data. The code in
Figure 22 gives the examiner the context to understand the purpose of each Java
method, attribute and class.
51
1 function hook(obj, options) {
2 var Exception = Java.use(’Java.lang.Exception’);
3 var func = options[’function’] !== undefined ? options[’function’] :
’$init’;
4 var args = options[’arguments’] !== undefined ? options[’arguments’] :
[];
5 var debug = options[’debug’] !== undefined ? options[’debug’] : false;
6 var callOriginal = options[’callOriginal’] !== undefined ?
options[’callOriginal’] : true;
7 var callback = options[’callback’] = options[’callback’];
8 try {
9 Java.use(obj)[func].overload.apply(null, args).implementation =
function() {
10 var args = [].slice.call(arguments);
11 var result = null;
12 // Call Origin Function If True
13 if (callOriginal) {
14 result = this[func].apply(this, args, self);
15 }
16 if (callback) { // Call Callback If Exist
17 result = callback(result, args);
18 }
19 // Debug Log
20 if (debug) {
21 var calledFrom =
Exception.$new().getStackTrace().toString().split(’,’)[1];





27 console.log(obj + "." + func + "[\"Debug\"] => " + message);
28 }
29 // Return Result
30 return result;
31 };
32 } catch (err) {// Error Log
33 console.log(obj + "." + func + "[\"Error\"] => " + err);
34 }
35 }







43 callback: function(originalResult, args, self) {
44 console.log("Args: " + args);




Figure 22: Method Hook.
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3.5 Synthesis
The fifth step in the DBIMAFIA methodology synthesizes the findings from the
class analysis phase to come to conclusions about how the application stores and
manipulates user data. Illustrating individual method, attribute and class results
in tables helps the examiner portray the results in an easy to read format. The
examiner also ensures that findings from each class are synthesized to articulate how
the application stores the user data.
3.6 Validation
The sixth and final step uses a byte debugger to determine the validity of conclu-
sions made in step five.
Examiners use the smalidea plugin [48] with Android Studio to step through the
.DEX files unpacked in Section 3.2.4. This does not require source code or repacking
of the app’s APK. Examiners set break points inside relevant methods identified in
the class analysis and synthesis steps to validate:
1. The values held by Class attributes.
2. The functionality of identified methods and classes.
3. The control flow of the application’s data serialization process.
Debuggers may not run on every application, due to the reasons outlined in Sec-
tion 2.2.3 of the Background section of this thesis. In these instances the examiner has
to rely on the static and Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) analysis techniques
outlined in step four of the DBIMAFIA methodology.
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3.7 Summary
In summary, the DBIMAFIA methodology covers device setup, the initial analysis
of the APK and application files, native library hooking, class analysis, and synthesis
and validation of results.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The results found by the Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Mobile Android Format
Investigation and Analysis (DBIMAFIA) methodlogy is broken into a common format
case study, and an unknown format case study. The common format case study
section describes a situation where an examiner identifies a known storage format
after initial analysis of the application of interest. The unkown format case study
shows the results from the situation when the format is unkown and DBIMAFIA
executes completely to determine the data types stored in the target file.
4.2 Common format case study
This section applies the DBIMAFIA methodology on the Samsung SmartThings
mobile application that is found to store its data in an SQL Lite database [89].
4.2.1 Device Setup: SmartThings
This case study used a Google Pixel 1 running the Android 9.1.0 operating system,
and the SmartThings Android application version 1.7.38-21. The phone was rooted
using the process outlined in the methodology and was connected to a terminal run-
ning ADB version 28.0.2.
4.2.2 Initial Analysis: SmartThings
Initial Analysis Step One: Logical copy of App files and APK
Before executing the application, the examiner logically copied the unmodified
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version of the SmartThingsV 1-7-38-21.apk and application related files over An-
droid Debug Bridge (ADB).
Initial Analysis Step Two: Application Interaction
The application required the physical SmartThings hub to be connected to the
internet and power before interaction could occur. Additionally, a multipurpose mag-
net sensor was attached to a door, and a Motion sensor was placed in an empty room.
The examiners opened the application, connected the two sensors to the SmartThings
application, and connected everything to WiFi. We verified that the devices were
properly connected, and Modification Detective was run. The examiners interact
with the physical sensors and modification Detective is stopped. This is repeated ten
times to ensure consistent results. The only file that was consistently pulled back was
the CloudDb.db file in the databases directory of the SmartThings application.
Initial Analysis Step Three: File Analysis
The linux file command returned the file type: SQLite 3.x database. The ex-
aminer then opened CloudDb.db with Sqllite, a common Structured Query Language
(SQL) database viewer. Table 2 outlines the tables found inside the CloudDb.db
database.
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Table 2: SmartThings CloudDB.db Tables.
Table Name Description
activity Contains event log of every sensor input
android metadata Contains location and language data.
cloud settings Key value pairs of server and mobile device.
continuity session Records connection sessions with server.
devices Information on all connected devices.
groups Groups devices based on location.
locations Table of all user defined locations.
plugin Table of all device ids in order of connection.
robotcleaners Holds current state of robot cleaner and location.
scenes User configured logic based on sensor input.
scenes action value type History of actions taken by scene logic.
Modification Detective, a script found in Section 1.1 of the Appendix, revealed that
when the smart sensors transmitted data, that they were written to the CloudDb.db
file in the databases directory of the SmartThings application.
The activity log, found in Table 3, records the activity of every sensor connected
to the SmartThings hub. Table 3 is an abbreviated version of the activity log table
in the CloudDb.db file. The epoch column is a format that records the date and time
that an event occurred. The CloudDb file also contained a device table that recorded
the device id, location, state of sensor and epoch field of all IoT activity. Examiners
found that the motion sensor collected and recorded motion sensor and temperature
data.
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Table 3: Abbreviated CloudDb.db activity log.
epoch text uiTimestamp
155803879500 contact of MP Sensor is: Open 1558038876206
155803879400 acceleration of MP Sensor is: Vibration detected 1558038876206
155803879300 motion of Motion Sensor is: Motion detected 1558038876206
155803879200 contact of MP Sensor is: Closed 1558038876206
155803879100 temperature of Motion Sensor is: 80°F 1558038876206
The examiners did not need to unpack or analyze the SmartThingsV 1-7-38.apk,
because the data of interest was found in plaintext, the DBIMAFIA methodology
indicates the examiner should skip to Step 5: Synthesis to summarize findings.
4.2.3 Synthesis: SmartThings
The SmartThings application was found to use the SQL Lite format to store its
user data. Validation with the debugger was not required as both the file command,
and the file extension noted the same file type.
4.2.4 Summary of Known Format Case Study
SmartThings was not alone in storing its application data in a known, unencrypted
data format. Examiners applied the DBIMAFIA methodology to fifteen applications,
fourteen of which used XML or SQL Lite formats to store their data. The outlier,
Hago Games is discussed in detail in Section 4.3 of this chapter.
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Table 4: Storage Formats of Analyzed Applications.
# Application Name Version Description Storage Format
1 August SmartLock 9.5.3 Lock SQL Lite
2 SmartThings 1.7.38-21 IoT Hub SQL Lite
3 Garmin Connect 4.22 Smart Watch SQL Lite
4 Harmony 5.4.1 IoT Hub SQL Lite
5 Wink 6.9.62.23006 IoT Hub SQL Lite
6 Tile 2.51.0 Bluetooth Tracker SQL Lite
7 Yale Connect 1.1.1 Lock SQL Lite
8 Whats App 2.19.360 Messenger SQL Lite
9 Instagram 123.0.0 Social Media SQL Lite
10 Ludo King 4.8.0 Game XML
11 Viber 11.7.05 Messenger SQL Lite
12 Tinder 11.6.0 Dating SQL Lite
13 TextNow 6.36.1 Messenger SQL Lite
14 WPSOffice 12.0.1 Document Manager XML
15 Hago Games 3.2.8 Game / Messenger ObjectBox DB
The applications outlined in Table 4 further divide into two categories: IoT and
non-IoT applications. The first 7 applications fall under the IoT category and were
found to store information about physical sensors. This included data about an indi-
vidual’s GPS location, physical health, and security practices. The next 6 applications
contained data about a user’s messaging activity, photos, GPS location, and browser
history.
As the SmartThings case study demonstrated in Table 3, users may not always
know or understand all the data collected by their applications or Internet of Things
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(IoT) devices. A motion sensor is not expected to collect temperature data. This
may seem insignificant, but in the case of a classified environment, temperature data
could indicate what is being stored in a building or room. The ability to determine
the format of data stored by an application is vital to the security expert’s ability to
properly classify applications and devices.
4.3 Unknown format use cases
This section shows the results from applying DBIMAFIA to the Hago Games
application [90] to determine how the application stores user data. This popular
application has over 200 million downloads from the Google Play Store and supports
voice and text-based communication with other players.
4.3.1 Device Setup: Hago Games
This case study used a Google Pixel 1 running the Android 9.1.0 operating system,
and the Hago Games application version 3.2.8. Examiners rooted the device using
the process outlined in Step One of methodology, and connectred it to a terminal
running ADB version 28.0.2. We then installed Frida version 12.6.11 on the device.
4.3.2 Initial Analysis: Hago Games
Initial Analysis Step One: Logical copy of App files and APK
Before the application executes, an unmodified version of the Android application
package (APK) and application related files were logically copied using the ADB pull
command.
Initial Analysis Step Two: Application Interaction
After making a logical copy of the application and all of its files, Modification
Detective was run. With the script running, we opened the Hago games application
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and sent messages to other players and Modification Detective pulled back modified
files. We repeated this process 10 times to ensure consistency and to identify the
file saving the application’s message data. Upon visual inspection of the pulled files,
examiners found the data.mdb file that stored Hago Games’ user data.
Initial Analysis Step Three: File Analysis
We used ADB to pull another copy of the application’s file directory. Running a
diff between the original \files\db 12885822986 directory and the same directory
after interaction, identified that the data.mdb file in the \files\db 12885822986
directory was created after application login.
The .mdb extension indicates the file is a Microsoft database file [91], but initial
attempts to open the file with Microsoft Access [92] resulted in an unrecognized
database format error.
Figure 23: Entropy graph of data.mdb.
Running the Linux file command on the data.mdb file returned “data”, indicat-
ing its format is not of a known file type. The Linux binwalk -E entropy command
displayed the graph shown in Figure 23. Encrypted files typically have fairly consis-
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tent entropy throughout; the constant change in entropy, indicated \files\db 12885822986
\data.mdb was not encrypted.
Figure 24: Strings in \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb.
As Figure 24 illustrates, the Linux strings command returned a series of deci-
pherable American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) strings.
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Figure 25: Hex representation of data.mdb.
We then opened \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb in HXD, a hex editor [93].
The examiners found the same strings output outlined in red in Figure 24, inside the
\files\db 12885822986\data.mdb file in Figure 25.
Initial Analysis Step Four: Unpack and Decompile APK
The examiners opened the HagoGamesV 3-2-8.APK in JEB, and the application
was unpacked and disassembled, exposing the Smali code of the application. The ex-
aminer now had direct access to the manifest.xml file, libraries, and the application
resource files.
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Initial Analysis Step Five: Identify Imported Libraries and Architec-
ture
We analyzed the first line of the application’s manifest.xml file to determine that
Hago Games was using Android’s software development kit version 28. We then in-
spected the application’s imported libraries and found the libobjectbox-jni shared
library file, a database library for mobile and IoT devices. Additionally, we found
that the Hago application was using the ARM64v8 architecture. With a possible lead
on a target file and related shared library, research now shifted to finding the code re-
sponsible for formatting the data written to the \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb
file.
4.3.3 Native Method Hooking: Hago Games
Examiners next hook the libc.so open() and write() methods interacting with
the \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb file. This step gave the examiner insight on
where to begin class analysis.
Native Method Hooking Step One: Hook Open Methods and Obtain
File Descriptor
We cleared the Hago Games data and cache prior to hooking the libc.so open()
to force the application to re-open the \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb file. Next,
we executed monkey -p com.yy.hiyo -c android.intent.category.LAUNCHER 1
to launch the Hago Games default activity via the ADB interface. The Frida com-
mand in Figure 20 uses the frida-Java-playground environment to run user defined
Javascript hooks on an application.
The code in Figure 15 reads the file path into the value variable and compares it
with the predefined target filename (/data/user/0/ com.yy.hiyo/files/db 12885822986/)
to determine if it should be saved in the file descriptor array.
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Native Method Hooking Step Two: Hook Write Methods, Dump Stack
and Capture Saved Data
Once the examiner has the file descriptor associated with \files\db 12885822986




[Top of Stack (Most Recently Called)]
Visiting method ’long
io.objectbox.BoxStore.nativeCreate(Java.lang.String, long, int,
byte[])’ at dex PC 0xffffffff (native PC 0x0)
upcall
Visiting method ’void
io.objectbox.BoxStore.<init>(io.objectbox.b)’ at dex PC 0x0066
Visiting method ’io.objectbox.BoxStore io.objectbox.b.a()’ at dex
PC 0x001b
Visiting method ’void com.yy.appbase.d.b.a(long)’ at dex PC 0x003b
Visiting method ’void com.yy.appbase.d.b.e()’ at dex PC 0x000f




Figure 26: Methods on the stack 1.
The examiner then logged into the Hago Games application, triggering a write
to \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb, and the call stack in Figure 26 printed to the
console. As Figure 26 indicates that io.objectbox.BoxStore.nativeCreate() is
the last method called before the data is written to \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb.
The contents of arguments passed into io.objectbox.BoxStore.nativeCreate()
were printed to the console. The first argument is the directory that stores the
data.mdb file that is written to. Upon visual inspection, argument four appears to
be an array of integers ranging from -128 to 127, that stores the data written to
\files\db 12885822986\data.mdb.










Figure 27: Debugging Stack Visitor2.
Native Method Hooking Step Three: Analysis of Written Bytes
Examiners used the unicode converter found on branah.com [87] to convert the
decimal array in argument 4 to unicode. Figure 28 shows that the bean names
and variables found in \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb were also found in the
byte array passed into io.objectbox.BoxStore.nativeCreate(). However, like the
data.mdb file, all of the data in between the outlined strings is undecipherable. The
non-ASCII characters indicate that this byte array contains non-unicode characters.
We now had a basic level understanding of the bytes written to the file and their
possible relation to the data inside \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb.
2The byte array in argument 4 was too long that it was not practical to include all the data in
this document.
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Figure 28: Unicode form of written bytes.
4.3.4 Class Analysis: Hago Games
In DBIMAFIA, step four, the examiner statically and dynamically analyzes meth-
ods involved with the formatting of the byte array written to \files \db 12885822986
\data.mdb. In an ideal scenario, our original list of method calls would include every
call involved with the formatting of the data. This was not the case for Hago Games.
As this section discusses, there was a constant need to go back and forth between
static analysis and Frida to track down the methods writing to the byte array.
We began static analysis with the native call made to io.objectbox.BoxStore.
nativeCreate() that was executed from the constructor of io.objectbox.BoxStore.
The byte array written to the database was saved inside the io.objectbox.b.a at-
tribute.
After associating the byte array in argument four of Figure 27 with io.objectbox.b,
we began dynamically analyzing the class and its attributes. Frida hooks on every
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method of the class allowed examiners to dump the arguments passed into and re-
turned from each method of the io.objectbox.b class. This combined with static
analysis of the class, resulted in tables6 and 5 that explain the attributes and methods
of the io.objectbox.b class.
Table 6: Methods of io.objectbox.b BoxStore class.
BoxStore Class
Method Return Type Description
<init>(io.boxstore.b) void Runs BoxStoreBuilder
a(File) String Checks and returns file path
a(Class) String Return DB name
a(Transaction, int[]) void Commit transactions
b(Class) int Return entity type Id
b(int) String Start Objectbox Browser
close() void Close boxstore
d(Class) Box Returns a box of given class
...




c long max size in KB
d int debug Flags
e bool debug Relations
f int max # readers
g int query attempts
h TXCallback helps sync data across devices









Figure 29: com.yy.appbase.data.e.a() method.
Examiners used Frida to hook io.objectbox.b.a() and print each individual
bean object passed into it as an argument. This gave examiners a full list of every
bean contained inside the greater io.objectbox.b object. A string search of the
APK’s code found references to the same list of beans in com.yy.appbase.data.e.
Figure 29, line 21 shows the io.objectbox.b class being created. Lines 22 through
50 of Figure 29 reference 29 separate bean model classes to define the properties and
instantiate each bean.
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Figure 30: com.yy.appbase.data.UserInfoBean objectBox.model class.
Figure 30 contains the UserInfoBean model class, one of the 29 bean model classes
identified by static analysis of com.yy.appbase.data.e. Notice the same strings were
found in the \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb in Figure 25, and the byte array in
Figure 28.
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Figure 31: com.yy.appbase.data.e.b() method.
We inspected the com.yy.appbase.data.e.b() method in Figure 31, and found
that line 58 creates an io.objectbox.d object and then each of the 29 individual
beans are added to the object in lines 62 through 502. Line 330 creates the new
userInfoBean entity within the io.objectbox.d object. Lines 331 through 361 define
its properties, and line 362 makes a call to the io.object- box.d.b() method to
finalize the UserInfoBean. Examiners now used Frida hooks to print the arguments
and return values of every method of io.objectbox.d to determine the purpose of
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each method and attribute. Table 8 and Table 7 summarize these findings.
Table 7: Attributes of io.objectbox.d.
Attribute Type Description
a FlatBufferBuilder FlatBufferBuilder
b List<Integer> entity offsets
c long version #
d int last entity ID
e long last entity UID
f int last index ID
g long last index UID
h int last relation ID
i long last relation UID
Table 8: Methods of io.objectbox.d.
io.objectbox.d Class
Method Return Type Description
<init>(io.objectbox.d) void
a(int, long) io.objectbox.d.a builds id property
a( list<int>) int
creates an array of offsets and
serializes as flatbuffer (integer)
a(int) io.objectbox.d.a builds flags
b() io.objectbox.d finalizes entity
b(int, long) io.objectbox.d.a builds index id property
c() void checks if more properties to add
. . .
We hooked the io.objectbox.d.a() method to trace the call stack, and variable
values throughout the method. Line 503 of Figure 31 calls the io.objectbox.d.a()
method found in Figure 32. Figure 32, line 242 and 243 grab the name and object
offsets for each bean and lines 244 and 247 add the offsets to the Google Flat Buffer
Builder. Finally, on line 258, the flat buffer builder (fbb) is returned as a byte array
into the a attribute of io.objectbox.b.
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Figure 32: io.objectbox.d.a() method.
We used Frida to print the stack’s contents right before the byte array was returned
on line 258 of Figure 32. Figure 33 is a call graph representation Frida’s output.
Figure 33: Call trace of byte array manipulations.
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4.3.5 Synthesis: Hago Games
Figure 34: Hago Games Data Serialization Process
The creation of the \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb is shown in Figure 34.
This process is further explained in three main steps:
1. com.yy.appbase.data.e.b()
(a) Creates model creator (io.objectbox.d).
(b) Adds beans and their attributes to the model creator.
(c) Serializes beans as fbb.
(d) Returns fbb.
2. io.objectbox.b.<init>
(a) Calls com.yy.appbase.data.e.a() to add bean.




(a) Passes fbb as byte array to io.objectbox.BoxStore.nativeCreate() to
create \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb.
The format of the byte array is modeled in Table 9. The beans and their attributes
are all stored inside the array passed into io.objectbox.BoxStore.nativeCreate().
The io.objectbox.BoxStore class itself is representative of \files\db 12885822986
\data.mdb.
These findings on how Hago Games uses ObjectBox library to store data in custom
file formats can be applied more broadly to any device or application using the Ob-
jectBox library. ObjectBox advertises itself as an edge database for IoT and mobile
applications. Since its release in 2016 ObjectBox has steadily grown in popularity.
The Objectbox library is not just popular in mobile applications, the library is used
in railway systems and continues to be used in various IoT and SCADA systems [94].
The Hago Games stored message history, location information, and personal data
on users. Our research found that any conversation with another Hago user resulted
in a userInfoBean being stored for that user. The userInfoBean was created im-
mediately after a message was sent and did not require the user to reply. This
userInfoBean contained location and birthday information that is not visually dis-
played in the application. This meant that examiners could send any user a message
and expose their full birthday and city. Users are unknowingly exposing their birth
dates and cities by using the Hago Games application. Examiners’ use of DBIMAFIA
gave them the ability to understand how Hago Games stored user data, which led to
the discovery of unnecessary personally identifiable information (PII) leakage.
4.3.6 Validation
We used Android Studio and the smalidea plugin [48] to bytecode debug the appli-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BoxStore, io.objectbox.b, com.yy.appbase.data.e, and io.objectbox.d classes.
We set break points on all of these classes to validate the purpose of their methods
and attributes. We stepped through the calls to various io.objectbox.d method
calls inside the com.yy.appbase.data.e.b() method and watched the fbb of each
bean being created. Finally, we traced the byte array from the io.objectbox.d.a()
method to the io.objectbox.BoxStore class and viewed the contents of both the
fbb byte array passed into the nativeCreate() method and the io.objectbox.b
object holding the traits of all the beans and their offsets. The examiners found that
the debugger’s findings validated DBIMAFIA’s results.
4.4 Summary
In summary, the application of the DBIMAFIA methodology was applied to the
15 Android applications found in Table 4. In Section 4.2, we found that 14 of our
15 applications used common formats to store user data. These applications stored
user’s GPS locations, messaging information, and private data.
In Section 4.3, we discovered that Hago Games used the ObjectBox shared library
to format and save data. The ObjectBox library used fbbs, and Java beans to serialize
the user data into \files\db 12885822986\data.mdb. Upon inspection of the data
stored by the Hago Games app, it was discovered that user’s birthdays and cities
were being unnecessarily exposed to other users. Furthermore, these findings on how
Hago Games uses ObjectBox library to store data in custom file formats can be




This thesis demonstrates that dynamic instrumentation tools combined with static
analysis tools can effectively determine the format of data stored by Android appli-
cations.
This paper presented a new approach to reverse engineering unknown file formats
of Android Applications. Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Mobile Android Format
Investigation and Analysis (DBIMAFIA) combines static analysis with the use of dy-
namic instrumentation tools to provide reverse engineers with a new way to approach
format analysis of Android application data. Mobile application developers commonly
obfuscate applications and add code to intentionally stop reverse engineers from de-
bugging their code. Use of dynamic instrumentation tools, like Frida, avoids the need
to modify the application’s code or properly decompile an application’s code. The
result is a process that circumvents the common anti-debug techniques implemented
by the developers.
With Samsung SmartThings and the thirteen other applications outlined in Ta-
ble 4, DBIMAFIA successfully Identified the format of data stored. Examiners found
that these applications used common formats to store their data and applied DBI-
MAFIA to quickly identify the location and format of relevent data. Examiners
discovered that applications one through fourteen in table 4 stored user’s GPS loca-
tions, messaging information, and physical security practices in SQL Lite or XML
formats.
With Hago Games, DBIMAFIA successfully identified the format of user data
stored. This application required the use of the Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
(DBI) tool, Frida, to trace the written byte array through its manipulations. Frida
hooks of Java methods were used to print the contents of the byte array and associated
objects to reveal the purpose of related classes, methods, and attributes. Examiners
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combined the use of Frida with static analysis to determine the objectBox format of
the Hago Games application. Examiners used their understanding of the objectBox
format to discover that full names, birthdays, and cities were being unnecessarily
exposed to other users.
5.1 Impact
The variety of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, mobile devices, and firmware
versions, provide a challenge for security experts. The security approach of today’s
desktop computers may not be practical as the cyber battle space continues to evolve.
Discovering ways to dynamically analyze mobile and IoT data is one of many steps
that must be taken as the Department of Defense (DoD) becomes more reliant on
a wider variety of electronic devices. This research explored how dynamic instru-
mentation tools can be used to aid an examiner analyzing mobile application data.
The DBIMAFIA methodology can be applied to aid forensic investigations, and the
classification of mobile devices. More directly, Hago users can be made aware of the
leakage of their birth dates and locations to other users. Furthermore, these findings
on how Hago Games uses ObjectBox library to store data in custom file formats can
be applied more broadly to any mobile, IoT, or SCADA device or application using
the ObjectBox library.
5.2 Future Work
The DoD recognizes that large collections of unclassified information poses a threat
to the United States. IoT and mobile device data is no different. Small amounts of
IoT and mobile data exposure might seem like a limited threat to the DoD, but
aggregated pools of mobile and IoT data could pose a threat to the security of this
nation. Research into what conclusions can be made from large scale analysis of
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aggregated IoT data would be invaluable to security experts.
The DBIMAFIA methodology successfully identified the format of user data on
an application that stored data in an unkown format. Applying the DBIMAFIA
methodology to determine the format of an application that encrypts its user data
would be an interesting case study.
This research found offsets within the code of the Hago games application. Future
research into using these offsets to design a parser for objectbox data files would be
of great value to investigators who want to quickly access the user data inside of any
mobile application or IoT or SCADA device using the ObjectBox library to save data.
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Appendix A. Appendix
1.1 Modification Detective Source Code
import sys, subprocess, time
# Creates a new file that is later used as a timestamp to find files changed since this file was
created
output_path = ""
bashCommand = "adb shell \"su -c touch /sdcard/new_file" + "\""
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
output_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
# Delay for user to run application as desired
delay= 15;
for x in range(delay):
print("Progress {:2.1%}".format(x / delay), end="\r")
time.sleep(1)
# Hardcoded path to applications data/data folder
folder = "/data/data/com.amazon.dee.app*"
# compiles a list of all files changed in th eapplications data foldersince the creation of new_file
(~ 30 seconds earlier)
bashCommand = "adb shell \"su -c find " + folder + " -type f -newer /sdcard/new_file >
/sdcard/list_files.txt" + "\""
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
output_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
time.sleep(1)
# Pulls a list of files that have been changed back to host
bashCommand = "adb pull /sdcard/list_files.txt"
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
output_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
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# Creates a temporary directory for changed files
bashCommand = "adb shell \"su -c mkdir /sdcard/temp" + "\""
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
output_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
# Reads in the filenames line by line into a string
fileName ="list_files.txt"
with open(fileName) as f:
files = f.readlines()
files = [line.rstrip(’\n’) for line in open(fileName)]
# MAkes of copy of each changed file in the temp directory created earlier
for name in files:
bashCommand = "adb shell \"su -c cp " + name + " /sdcard/temp" + "\""
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
utput_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
time.sleep(1)
# Pulls the folder of edited files back to host
bashCommand = "adb pull /sdcard/temp"
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
utput_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
time.sleep(1)
# Cleans up and removes all created folders and files
bashCommand = "adb shell \"su -c rm -r /sdcard/temp" + "\""
print(’\t[+] ’ + bashCommand)
output_byte = subprocess.check_output([’bash’,’-c’, bashCommand])
print("\t" + str(output_byte, ’utf-8’))
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